



A Genealogy of Mediation in International Relations: 
From ‘Analogue’ to ‘Digital’ Forms of Global Justice or Managed War?1 
Abstract 
What does it mean to mediate in the contemporary world? During the Cold War and since 
various forms of international intervention maintained a fragile strategic and territorially 
sovereign balance between states and their elite leaders, or built new states and inculcated 
new norms. In the post-Cold War era intervention and mediation shifted beyond the balance 
of power and towards the liberal peace, as in Bosnia Herzegovina. In the case of Northern 
Ireland, identity, territorial sovereignty, and the nature of governance also began to be 
mediated, leading to more complex, post-liberal formulations. This article offers and 
evaluates a genealogy of the evolution of international mediation. 





During the Cold War, and since, international mediation has become a well-recognised tool of 
conflict management and diplomacy, used by the US, the UN, a range of INGO and private 
                                                 
1 Thanks to several anonymous reviewers who put a great deal of effort into helping me 
clarify my argument, as well as to audience members at several workshops and conferences 
including a presentation at the Global South Unit for Mediation, PUC, Rio de Janeiro, July 
2016, and the University of Tromso, 23 January, 2015. Any errors remain mine alone. 
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actors (Bercovitch 1992). It has shifted from Realpolitik to the norms of the UN Charter, in 
line with the foreign policy of the US and EU: concerted attempts have been made to support 
and improve its application (Touval 2003: UN 2009).  
Mediation has been regularly used at ‘great power’ conferences (eg for nuclear 
disarmament) or by major powers between smaller ones (such as in the Middle East leading 
to the Camp David Agreement in 1978, or the Dayton Agreement in the 1995). It has been 
used to create cease-fires and adjust borders (as with the Naivasha Agreement signed in 2005 
between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan), and to 
arrange reparations (as during Colombian peace talks).2 It has often aimed at constitutional 
settlements, as in the Cyprus conflict from 1964 onwards, at the Paris Talks over Cambodia in 
1989-91, Dayton for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, and Rambouillet over Kosovo in 1999. It 
has been a tool of last resort during on-going violence, as with UN mediation over the Syrian 
conflict in 2014. It has been used for issues of WMD disarmament (as with various attempts 
with Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and 2000s), and or to bring about compliance with 
international law or legal procedures (as with the pursuit of suspected Serbian war criminals 
in the late 1990s). It has been recently used in Yemen, Syria and Libya, and the EU has 
established a Mediation Support Team to strengthen its External Action Service.3  However, 
the use of mediation has also shifted to small-scale conflicts in the global south, rather than 
dealing with the deep structural conflicts in the international system. Broad teams of 
mediators have been deployed in such conflicts since the 1990s, however, often connecting 
mediation to civil society actors. In 2014, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution 
                                                 
2 Camp David Accords. (1978) available at 
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/is14.pdf. General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (1995) available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52577.htm. Naivasha Agreement. (2005) available at 
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515.  
3 See for example, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/index_en.htm. 
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aimed at strengthening mediation (UN General Assembly, Resolution 2014), in line with the 
EU (EU, 2009), but does this coordinated response go far enough (Bhattarai, 2016: 43)?  
This paper outlines a genealogical approach to mediation in theory. It outlines stage 1 
forms of mediation, meaning traditional, realist conceptions. Then the paper discusses the 
contours of liberal mediation representing stage 2 in its evolution, with its cosmopolitan and 
normative goals. It then turns to stage 3, which is divided between two possible post-liberal 
forms: essentially a hybrid of strategic, liberal, and local forms of mediation (broadly 
defined) and technological/neoliberal alternatives.   
It refers to several cases, including Cyprus, the Middle East, Bosnia, and Northern 
Ireland, which have received considerable attention.  In the Middle East (principally Egypt-
Israel in the 1970s during the Cold war) mediation supported a traditional system of territorial 
sovereignty. In Cyprus, UN and later EU mediation has tried to transcend territorialism and 
nationalism. In Bosnia Herzegovina, mediation aimed at a liberal peace type settlement, 
supported by a classic post-Cold War Peacebuilding operation. In Northern Ireland mediation 
occurred in the new normative and more integrated order of the post-Cold war, and managed 
to develop a new and less territorial system of governance. Using these cases, through a 
critical mode of analysis connected to genealogy and ‘eirenism’ (the subaltern view of 
politics, power, and peace (====: introduction)), this paper shows how mediation praxis may 
be evolving (Assefa 1987; Bercovitch et al. 1992; Kleibor 1996; Mandell et al. 1991; Princen 
1991; =====; Ryan 1990). These stages overlap, carry continuities, and indicate specific 
differences across eras and cases, but they also connect the changing structure of international 
order to the development of methods to maintain it- from analogue to digital (to deploy a 
contemporary analogy). The article concludes with some comments about what a 




Genealogy and Mediation 
 
Standard analyses of mediation generally attempt to place it within a framework of 
reconstruction or bargaining (Bercovitch, 1999),  with the goal being a stabilisation of the 
existing order and its associated territorial and normative rationalities. A genealogical 
approach would underline the limits of such a conservative, hierarchical, and static form of an 
analysis particularly in terms of power, justice and rights claims. It would attempt to uncover 
hidden, historical power relations and resistances through the process of mediation, setting 
the scene for a just settlement. This raises an important contemporary question: what does it 
mean to ‘mediate’ in a world in transition and in broader, less literal terms, as IR passes into a 
new, probably post-liberal era where emancipatory discourses are entwined with structural 
forms of power? System maintenance may well contradict the critical goals of disputants, 
particularly if civil society actors are involved in negotiations. A critical or indeed post-
structuralist view of mediation highlights the relations between often violently different 
historical positions and interests. It speaks to larger, post-colonial and genealogical questions 
about the nature of the order that is being reproduced, resisted, or reformed (Foucault, 1972: 
83).  
Any form of mediation inhabits a space between claims made about politics backed 
by violence in the state centric dimension, in the diplomatic and material frame, in historical 
and normative dimensions, and according to social and subaltern perspectives. A genealogical 
approach places mediation within an interpersonal diplomatic framework within the states-
system and also in the broader, multi-dimensional terms of historical and distributive justice 
across the global commons (Connolly, 2017). It highlights the subaltern struggle for rights 
and sustainability just as much as the elite struggle for order and control (Spivak, 1988, Scott, 
1992, Escobar 1995, Bell, 1996, Connolly 2017).   
5 
 
This evolution can be broken down into three main stages, as follows. 
 
Stage 1: Mediation in Modernity: Maintaining State-Centric Order 
 
International mediation was theorised during the Cold War as a high-level, short-term process 
that aimed at a fragile strategic balance of power between states and their elite leaders, using 
a mixture of diplomacy, status and overt power (Bercovitch 1996; Zartman et al. 1997). 
Mediation was an official process of conflict management where disputants were assisted by 
an outside an individual, organization, group, or a state, to settle a conflict without further use 
of violence according to the law, applying techniques, resources, legitimacy or knowledge 
brought in by the third party. Disputants retained control over the process, it was ad hoc, and 
impermanent (Bercovitch, 2004).  
The cases of the UN Secretary General’s  mediation in Cyprus since 1964 and US 
Presidential mediation in the Middle East in the mid-1970s, indicate its main dynamics and 
constraints. These conflicts and the resultant peace negotiations were asymmetrical in that 
non-state and state actors attempted to maintain or gain sovereignty and contest disputed land 
and borders in order to enter the states-system. They involved appealing to the authority and 
legitimacy of the states-system and its elite representatives: the only framework through 
which political objectives could be met (Miall 1992). Regional and global actors/ states 
became involved as a consequence, bilaterally or multilaterally. External actors had little or 
no recourse direct to affected populations, and generally had to respect the status and 
positions of their diplomatic, political, or military representatives and interlocutors, because 
of their mutual endorsement of the norm of sovereignty. Regional security and state 
sovereignty were placed at a higher premium than human security though restitution for 
wrongs against civilian populations was sometimes sought. Global and regional hegemons 
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determined how priorities are organised, however. In genealogical terms this led to system-
maintenance, in which the struggle for rights and recognition could only occur within an 
analogue (territorial, institutional, and sovereign) framework of national self-determination, 
where no significant superpower concerns were raised (Pierson 2002: Kissinger 1994).  
In Cyprus and in the absence of any powerful interests or associated mediators (as 
with US President Carter at Camp David), the UN Secretary General and his representatives 
initially tried to design a peace treaty, using the security and political space provided by the 
presence of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). From its beginning in 1964 this process 
did not meet with the satisfaction of the then dominant Greek Cypriot side which felt it 
repeated the mistakes of the 1960 constitution in favouring the minority, Turkish Cypriot 
side. The Greek Cypriot side argued that the norm of national self-determination for the 
majority meant they should not have to make concessions to the minority, even at the behest 
of a moral authority such as the UN Secretary General. This strategy backfired when in 1974 
right-wing extremists launch a coup in Cyprus in favour of even more nationalist positions. 
This provided Turkish forces with a reason to act to create a new status more in their 
territorial, if not political or legal, favour (Birand 1985:1-11).  
Subsequently, the UN mediation process simply adapted to the new geopolitical 
power structures (despite calls for justice), grounding the legitimacy of peace on the 
potential, if reluctant, consent of all sides’ governments. This created a dynamic where for 
political reasons both side preferred continuing talks (and escaping blame for failure) to 
making concessions, which has held ever since. Mediation was mainly involved in 
maintaining the talks though preliminary part-agreements were signed in 1977 and 1977. 
Sophisticated mediation tools were used to arrive at these positions, including ‘shuttle 
mediation’ to overcome the two sides unequal legal status, and the production of non-binding 
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‘non-papers’ to avoid inadvertent recognition of the north. Such elite level tactics blocked 
compromise and filtered widely across both societies (Constantinou & Papadakis 2001). 
Mediation effectively maintained the status quo, satisfying the ‘devious objectives’ of 
the disputants to preserve their current positions and give little away (===), though 
discussions have inched forward over five decades. At times both parties have run the risk of 
being identified as spoilers in their attempt to manipulate the peace process, and have spent 
much of their negotiating energies on avoiding making compromises or taking blame (Doyle 
2011:261). As the debate has been framed by territoriality, sovereignty, and conservative 
understandings of international law, little progress has been possible, especially as the 
mediator has little practical leverage.  
Under the conditions of potential EU accession, and a framework which would both 
be more liberalised and less territorialised, as well as the collapse in the legitimacy of ethnic 
identity as an ordering system, the early 2000s looked more promising. UN mediation now 
led to a draft agreement, because benefits had increased for both sides, including the Turkish 
side, in the guise of EU integration. Militarism, ethno-nationalism and majoritarianism now 
appeared to be retrograde (The Annan Plan 2004). A concerted nationalist campaign blocked 
the Annan Plan however, leaving UN and EU personnel furious (Hannay 2004:37-54: Palley 
2005). International mediation, its assumptions of give and take according to an incentive 
structure within the framework of a now revised form of territorial statehood, appeared to be 
flawed. 
Similar dynamics can be gleaned from other stage 1 type cases from this era. Power 
and territoriality were contested by leaders in the case of mediation between Israel and Egypt 
(Princen 1992). Elite level power mediation, as practiced by President Carter, could only 
bring about a solution by removing key issues from the table (in this case the Palestinian 
situation). His mediation did not judge the nature of the involved states’ regimes, but 
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exercised power and diplomatic ambiguity, carving up the issues into what could be solved 
quickly and what had to be left out, regardless of injustice. In this case (as in Cyprus), the 
wider public was rarely consulted. This allowed elites to continue to avoid certain issues, 
leading to unresolved and potentially conflict inducing problems for the future (Wright 
2014:243).  
The usual approaches of constructive ambiguity in the agreement actually preserved 
the status of the negotiating teams through allowing them to claim success, albeit at the 
expense of a positive peace. Mediation focussed on offering substantial incentives and state 
defined security interests between disputants, who regularly threatened to end the process, 
implying a return to war. In neither of these cases were disputants able to think or act outside 
of state security frameworks, and thus they were not able to deal with identity or rights issues 
in a way commensurate with basic notions of human rights or social perceptions of what 
might be just. Indeed, the danger was that an agreement might provide incentives for further 
violence (Keen 2012:31). Justice was diluted by claiming success whilst preserving power 
and status.  
Stage 1 type agreements, even if backed by force and lacking justice, may achieve 
legitimacy within the states-system, however, as was the case between Israel and Egypt in 
1979. Mediation through the role of a powerful or status wielding (normally male), 
representative of the state was aimed at mitigating the clash of interests between power bases, 
resulting in a trading of concessions in return for international incentives, which maintains 
the states-system and minimises direct violence. It is thus inherently conservative. It involves 
accepting structural violence: badly drawn boundaries, sometimes war crimes, movements of 
populations, refugees, damage to property, and so on, in the interests of a removal of the 
threat of violence for a security community or the international community, removing any 
conceptual threat for the latter. Its heritage is of mainly European, elite diplomacy 
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(Constantinou & DerDerien, 2010: Constantinou 2004), the Westphalian system of 
sovereignty, and an elite-led, military and rational-legal discourse. Stage 1 mediation adopted 
problem-solving approaches to maintain territorial, material, ideological, normative and 
hierarchical aspects of the current order.   
Civilian populations were generally seen as relatively passive audiences to attempts to 
replace violence with discursive institutional processes, ceasefires, and mutual recognition, 
which led to formal agreements.  However, most peace processes, from Camp David to the 
Oslo process, were ultimately been blocked by the very issues they tried to resolve. Indeed, 
the very frameworks used to make progress have often also become new points of contention 
(Wright 2014:243). The fate of the Oslo process might be indicative for current talks in Syria, 
in Libya, and in South Sudan. Recommendations for, or indeed actual, uses of power, have 
often been the result in order to unravel the resultant deadlocks (Princen 1992: Holbrooke, 
1998) in order to support the integrity of the terms set by the states-system and global 
governance (Zartman et al. 2010).  
Non-state actors posed extremely difficult obstacles for this system, in terms of 
including their demands, accepting their legitimacy, power, and status, and ultimately 
resolving their issues, as attempts at mediation including Tamil representatives in Sri Lanka, 
Turkish Cypriot representatives in Cyprus, Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, or Palestinians in 
the Middle East peace prices, at various times have regularly illustrated.  
 The limitations of stage 1 mediation led to ‘devious objectives’ and spoiling 
(Stedman, 1997). Disputants involved in stage 1 type mediation tended to avoid trading 
concessions, and the continuation of the ‘peace’ process became more important than a 
settlement in order to avoid the dismantling of elite power structures. In the absence of 
military victory a peace process fills the space between losing and conceding to geopolitical, 
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normative, or ideological imposition. Alternatively spoilers used limited violence to guide the 
process towards their goals.  
Stage 1 mediation in the Middle East (principally Egypt-Israel and Israel-Palestine), 
led to ever increasingly sophisticated systems of territorial control. In Cyprus the role of the 
UN and EU has failed to transcend territorial-nationalism (but may now be on the brink of 
doing so). In the related literatures there were frequent discussions of ‘ripe moments’, 
‘hurting stalemates’, power, neutrality and impartiality. The eventual conclusions of these 
debates suggested that mediators needed to understand the language and praxis of diplomacy, 
and if success was to be achieved, access to some of the power that states controlled 
(Newman et al. 2006). Success was thus defined as either a basic and agreed security order (a 
cease-fire or a new border), and possibly to contribute to a more sophisticated framework (eg 
constitutional change) (Kleiboer 1996:376). In many cases, as with the TRNC, Palestine, 
Kashmir, or Western Sahara, the existing state and self-determination system has not been 
able to resolve secessionist political claims in the medium of long-term. Awkward status-quos 
have emerged in such situations, though in some (as in Kashmir) violence has resumed or the 
agreement did not stick, even in a rudimentary manner.  
In maintaining the existing state-system stage 1 mediation pointed to systemic failure 
in its analogue form. Despite its claims of pragmatism through limited goals, stage 1 
outcomes have been determined by historical and state-centric power relations rather than 
diplomacy or norms. It has sustained the logical of territoriality and the rationalities 
associated with both social and international hierarchies of groups and states. Ceasefires often 
broke down, as in the Middle East after the 1967 war, or peacekeeping forces were drawn 
into local and regional conflicts as in Congo after 1960. Mediation processes often stumbled 
on, making only incremental gains, as in Cyprus after 1964. Talks for the sake of talks, 
avoiding blame, non-papers, back-sliding, and maintaining the integrity of the states-system, 
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all tended to take priority over the assumption of a compromise agreement (Kleiboer 1996). 
This rationality of mediation concluded that mediators with power were more effective, and 
implicitly became an apologia for the excesses of power over justice (Princen 1992). Only a 
few theoretical contributions offered problematized versions of this debate: occasionally the 
role of culture in communication was raised (Cohen 1996:107) and on rare occasions, 
alternative rationalities were offered (Constantinou, 2004). 
 
Stage 2: Liberal Approaches to International Mediation 
 
Debates about unofficial forms of mediation, the diversity of power, the limits of consent or 
neutrality, and the role of civil society and NGOs soon began to emerge in response to the 
problems inherent in stage 1 approaches (Dixon 1996: Fisher, 2006). After the Cold War 
mediation began to be connected with the liberal peace and its normative political and 
economic framework within the confines of the existing states-system (Paris 2004): 
foregrounding democracy, human rights and free trade. Mediation began to be seen more 
broadly as a way of settling, resolving, or pacifying differences through diplomacy, law, 
institutional reform, and thus state and regional design. A peace process would incorporate 
power sharing, consociational arrangements between elites, as well as negotiations over 
international borders and the redistribution of territory (O’Leary 2005). Such development is 
exemplified by debates on regional integration in the EU as a normative process, or 
statebuilding debates on how best to build a better polity (Manners 2008; Paris et al. 2009). 
The pros and cons of liberal peace approaches to mediation have been the topic of 
some debate since the 1990s when the use of UN mediation in particular began to 
significantly increase (Convergne, 2016: 137) and a related epistemic community began to 
emerge (ibid: 144). This meant peace processes would require significant structural and 
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normative changes in conflict-affected societies, following ‘best-practice’ in western post-war 
states. In genealogical terms, this is where the civilising mission of colonial states was 
translated into modernisation, development, democratisation and rights: trusteeship gave way 
to assimilation into the liberal international architecture. State fragility as well as state power 
were now more clearly understood, and informal and non-state actors were increasingly 
prominent. Civil society was now an important part of a viable peace system, crystallised by 
basic human rights norms. Civil society, NGOs, informal actors, as well as more traditional 
mediators began to form teams working for a common goal (Garrigues, 2015). 
Diplomatically, liberal peacebuilding (as it came to be known) followed on in the 
footsteps of Carter’s power mediation in the Middle East: Richard Holbrooke’s mediation in 
the Bosnian conflict at Dayton was indicative of a realist-liberal evolution. Holbrooke’s role 
in the Bosnian conflict exploited a combination of American power, EU incentive structures, 
and the disputants’ exhaustion (van Es 2002). It clearly pointed to the need for democratic, 
liberal, rights-oriented power-sharing across relatively segregated ethnic lines. Thus, stage 2 
mediation attempted to foreground rights and institutions over unmoderated geopolitical 
power but power mediation also remained crucial (Holbrooke 1998: Kostic 2009: Keane 
2001:61). Secondary aims were to restabilise the country and region, through a division of 
territory and power-sharing according to ethnic identity. Justice was secondary to these goals 
but violence was successfully proscribed because of the presence of NATO-led 
Implementation Force troops, and because the Office of the High Representative policed the 
boundaries of civil politics, along with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. The construction of a liberal state was marred, however, by the fact that both the 
process and the OHR were subsequently seen as unaccountable by the population.  
Stage 2 mediation thus addressed but also accentuated the tension between peace and 
justice. It maintained the structures of the post-Cold War world: the resultant states-system, 
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liberal political arrangements, and distribution of global capital under globalisation. It also 
saw more ambitious objectives entering its normative and cosmopolitan repertoire, 
supporting rights and civil society.  Such ambition was reflected in institutional 
developments, including the formation of the Mediation Support Unit within UNDPA in 
2006, and more hybrid approaches, such as in the Philippines, which included states, INGOs, 
academics, and social actors (Convergne, 2016: 138). The EU attempted to strengthen its 
mediation capacities in 2009, also reflecting this evolution (Council of the European Union, 
2009).  
The broadening of mediation theory and practice presented some paradoxes, as a 
consequence. In Liberia civil society was included in the peace process as well as warlords, 
raising concerns about the latter’s impunity and appeasement.  Civil society was 
understandably concerned about the elite’s role (Toure 2002), yet power-sharing dictated their 
presence: there could be no peace without either powerful elites or social actors. This led to a 
dilemma: including corrupt elites, as in Cambodia or Tajikistan, meant injustice is hard to 
eradicate from the state (Keane 2001:34). The concept of ‘spoilers’ (Stedman 1997) was also 
added to explain the actions of those actors who seemed to be impervious to the ‘good sense’ 
of liberal approaches (Newman et al. 2006). The new logic of cosmopolitan norms meant that 
geopolitical and social stratification could not be endorsed by any peace agreement, but 
instead must be significantly modified by a settlement.  
It was still indicative of an international discourse in which liberal approaches to 
mediation operated in the analogue, formal, terrain of the state-centric world, albeit states that 
were to be democratic and respect international law. However, a genealogical perspective 
highlights post-colonial and euro-centric limitations in terms of the distribution of power and 






By the 1990s multilateralism and the liberal international architecture had become 
deadlocked. It was becoming clear that the states-system, identity, regionalism, international 
law, global trade, and trans-national movements are all entwined, often agonistically. This 
should have been unsurprising: identity, culture, and material distribution across the state and 
international system have long been seen as contradictory but necessarily formative and 
influential of political order, itself subject to power and ideology (Tilly 1993:5; Tilly 1990:15; 
Tilly 1985:169-191). However, the centrality of the state, and the ‘naturalised’ hierarchy of 
international order were increasingly being widely challenged (Krohn-Hansen et al. 2005).  
Stage 2 mediation offered comprehensive and multidimensional forms of 
peacebuilding, in which mediation played a role in disseminating the liberal peace to conflict-
affected areas outside of the global north. Such strategies soon came to be seen as order 
producing only in the short term, and more likely to be connected with the stabilisation of an 
unjust order. Indeed the legitimacy of the unreformed UN system was also being challenged 
in an increasingly post-colonial environment, more concerned with rights and equality than 
coordination and efficiency. 
 Consequently, a genealogical perspective of stage 2 forms of mediation depicted it as 
a Eurocentric tool for managing the post-Cold War status quo. Its normative grounding in 
rights and democracy is limited in a world shaped by colonialism, the Cold War ideological 
struggle, capitalism and inequality. Furthermore, mediation theory had not engaged with the 
critical developments that had occurred in international theory or politics over the last 25 
years.  There is not yet any engagement with post-colonial theory, little with gender, Social 
constructivism, critical theory, nor much of an interest in environmental dynamics. Since the 
early 2000s mediation as an ordering tool has carried limited weight (except perhaps in the 
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Global South). It appears to have become overloaded with norms and tasks, mediating 
different cultural and normative systems including that of the UN (UN, 2012:12-14), whilst 
being unable to respond to deeper structural issues of representation, inequality, and 
sustainable, or to support global justice.  
As in Cyprus, international statesmen and women are reluctant to risk their reputation 
with failure or rejection, and sense that they have little moral or material weight to exert. 
Many senior players in international relations have never been involved in mediation and 
only a few, such as Lakhdar Brahimi or Hans Blix, have been willing to risk a potential 
‘graveyard for diplomats’.4 Conflicts often are unmediated for long periods: as in eastern 
Ukraine, Syria, and the rise of ISIS in Iraq and across the region, or in the South China seas. 
Stage 1 and 2 forms of mediation have been unable to deal with the recent changes in the 
hierarchy of states, the emergence of ‘hybrid war’ (Glenn 2009; Deep 2015), the 
advancement of democracy and human rights, the emphasis on globalised capital, the 
emergence of various transnational networks, new technologies, and an increasing emphasis 
on sustainability. 
Even in cases where mediation continues sporadically, as in Cyprus, Syria or in South 
Sudan recently, international support is lacking and such roles are easily brushed off or 
ignored, due to the wide variety of actors and limited clarity in terms of who holds legitimate 
political authority (Garrigues, 2015: 3). At one level this indicates a lack of international 
consensus and political will, a lack of resources, a lack of weight attributed to discourses of 
compromise and cooperation: at another it indicates that many conflicts operate outside of the 
limits of the states-system or liberal international architecture.  
Some of this may be attributed to the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which has partially discredited the West and its institutions, as well as failures in 
                                                 
4
 This epithet has been widely used over the last decades of analysis of the Cyprus Problem. 
‘Island of Troubles’, The Economist, 19 December 2002. 
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peace processes from the Middle East to Cyprus without any real penalty, and the 
inconsistency of a world order based on sovereignty and global capitalism rather than human 
security and than international law. It may also be related to the rise of other key actors and 
their very different positions on international order, including China and Russia in particular.  
Some of these factors were very much the case with the UN attempt to mediate in 
Libya in 2011, which failed because Gaddafi could not accept the need for a political 
transition nor the claims of the revolutionaries. The UN Security Council was also divided 
and it was difficult to identify who were the parties to the conflict, what their positions were, 
and who actually held power. There were few institutions and little experience of political 
compromise. It did fit with not stage 2  forms of mediation (Bartu 2014), and stage 1 
approaches appeared to be too anachronistic to deploy.  
Uncertainty about the nature of conflict in today’s world as well as the unsuitability of 
existing tools has led to a search for new thinking (Convergne 2016: 136 & 152). In the next 
section I discuss the emergence of a third framework as a response.  
 
Stage 3 Post-Liberal Mediation 
 
A response to the genealogical critique of both forms of mediation is now required, one that 
recognises the dangers of deeper, structural and direct forms of power, expands the rights of 
civil society, refrains from depoliticising technocratic governmentality and neo-trusteeship, 
and thus and is closely connected to global justice. What would a genealogically informed 
version of mediation  aimed at global justice in an increasingly fluid and digital world, rather 
than geopolitics (as in stage 1) or liberal peace (as in stage 2) entail?  
Stage 3 mediation as a broad communicative and discursive practice has to navigate 
between the analogue echoes of 17th and 18th Century understandings of sovereignty, 19th and 
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20th Century understandings of liberalism and capitalism, and the neoliberal and post-liberal 
world of the 2000s, now including a far wider range of voices than ever before. Much of the 
language used in stage 1 and 2 formats needs to be thoroughly reconfigured to respond to 
temporal, environmental, cultural, and material matters as viewed from the subaltern 
positionality. It still has to contend with obstructive and regressive power: mediating state and 
elite interests in the mould of 19th Century Realpolitik, as well as the subaltern claims made 
against a peace agreement, state, and international architecture. Increasingly, diverse 
mediation and dialogue networks make a more post-liberal version plausible as the 
understanding of the dynamics of discursive approaches to conflict deepens (Ramsbotham, 
2010).  
Mediation now occurs in a post-liberal world where many of the post-war structures 
and frameworks have shifted (===). If mediation was to be improved as respond to these 
shifts, post-liberal approaches would continue to engage with liberalism, but also offer a 
global justice oriented sensibility and sensitivity. They would rest upon a global epistemic 
community of understanding and justice, rather than merely on northern practices.5 Their 
post-colonial underpinnings point to on-going power-relations with state relations and the 
global economy (Sabaratnam, 2011: 781-803). However, since the 1990s, back channel 
mediation, informal diplomacy, citizen diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches have 
become influential. Similarly, a growing NGO and INGO community have become heavily 
involved in delivering services to diverse communities, as well as advising governments and 
international actors. Governments, IGOs, and IFIs have encountered a wide variety of 
identities and positionalities in their engagements around the world since the 1990s, which 
has caused them to be more, though not deeply, reflexive and inclusive (though it  has also 
caused their securitisation (Duffield 2012)). Post-liberal approaches highlight the 
                                                 
5 See for example the Mediation Support Network. 
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accommodation in the context of difference, less direct forms of intervention (after the 
debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq), and social forms of legitimacy. The strict hierarchies of 
diplomacy that mediation once deferred to are now hard to sustain. Informal actors, networks, 
polities that are not states, and issues that are outside of the secular, westernised, normative 
framework system may become more prominent. Justice demands across time and space have 
become much broader and more forcefully claimed than even 25 years ago.  
This indicates further requirements for new forms of mediation. In a more digital and 
fluid framework, mediation has to be able to operate across mobile and networked platforms 
of agency and authority, with a view not merely to maintaining the states-system or 
inculcating liberal norms, but with a view to enabling global justice. A progressive re-
arrangement of material resources within and across all types of state and societies would 
inevitably become part of mediation, the solutions it produces and the political arrangements 
that emanate from such settlements. It would require the extension of concepts like human 
security, structural inequality, distributive and historical injustice, the limitations of 
sovereignty, the global commons, post-colonial politics, the pros and cons of political 
liberalism, and intervention. Its rationality and logic would have to be driven by local, 
everyday issues, and agency, to a significant  degree, meaning an engagement with contextual 
knowledge and systems, the use of co-mediation incorporating local social movements, peace 
committees, and other scalar and transversal movements (Accord, 2015: 14). These broad 
processes then need to be refined into networked, mobile, transversal and trans-scalar forms 
of social legitimacy, then legitimate authority (probably at the ‘state’ level), and reformed 
regional and international architecture: global governance and capital would be tools for 
global justice. 




(i) the need for pluralism across widely divergent normative and identity frameworks; 
(ii) the need for development and growing equality across different temporal, 
geographic and material positionalities (distributive,  historical, and global justice);  
(iii) and the need for long-term environmental sustainability within a critical human 
security framework underpinned by networked agency and mobile subjects.  
 
Thus post-liberal mediation would mediate difference through inter-subjectivity, widely 
varying positionalities, as well as work towards environmental and social sustainability, 
through and beyond the state (Jabri 1990; Brigg et al. 2011). It would need to engage across 
the local to global scales, mediating the inconsistencies and tensions that emerge through a 
broad epistemic community, both multi-vertical and multi-lateral. It would need to produce 
settlements acceptable for critical and mobile subjects. In other words, these ‘impossible 
tasks’ would demand forms of mediation aimed at global justice. 
 Hints of stage 3 mediation might be seen in the case of Northern Ireland. Here the role 
of a concert of mediators, from the US, UK, EU, back-door, formal, and across society, civil 
and others, began to develop an approach that was concerned with de-emphasising 
homogeneity, territory, and centralised sites of governance (Wolff 2004). It aimed to resolve 
the range of identity, religious, territorial, and governance issues that had fed the conflict 
since the 1960s, as well as addressing longer standing issues stemming from British policy 
throughout the 20th Century. Mediation on the part of a range of US, UK, formal and informal 
individuals and groups dismantled territorial sovereignty to a degree through system of 
governance shared between institutions in Belfast, Dublin, London, and Brussels, as well as a 
range of informal actors. This represented an attempt to accommodate sectarian difference, 
navigate around the problem of multiple claims over territory, competing governance 
systems, as well as material inequality (Powell 2008; Cox et al. 2006). To date the Good 
20 
 
Friday Accords of 1998 are perhaps the most stable of the agreements so far examined, even 
though they have also been regularly challenged and the neoliberal economic framing that 
has more recently emerged has undermined them further. Mediation supported the 
accommodation of wide and competing claims and a less centralised, territorialised mode of 
governance, aimed at equalisation. This might be termed post-liberal: it bridged but did not 
challenge difference; it found ways of allowing but dampening territorialism and centralised 
government; and though capitalism was essential to it, more significant was the social and 
infrastructural parts of the agreement funded by vast UK and EU funds.6 
 After the discursive turn, and in the context of Bourdieuian notions of habitus, in a 
world where fixed categories are weakened, it is time to update ‘international mediation’ as 
praxis for an agonistic, multi-discursive world, of scales, relationships, mobility, networks, 
and justice demands across time and space.  This world is hesitantly accepting the necessity 
of inclusivity and equality, or equa-liberty in the words of Balibar.  Micro-solidarities, 
heterotopias, and a range of networked agencies are pushing in this direction (Massey 
2007:184, 200; Escobar 2008:11-12; Balibar 2002; Michel 1984; Foucault 2002a; Foucault 
2002b; Bhabha 1994). Negotiation, mediation, translation, thus complement the production of 
a progressive and legitimate order. 
Post-liberal mediation might be characterised in the following manner: it is a broad, 
bridging activity, involving a scalar range of actors, from the local to the global, from the 
informal to the formal, often working in teams. Sometimes it is hard to see who mediators 
are, as roles slip and change. It operates in different fora, according to different norms and 
interests simultaneously. Mediation spans the realms of identity, emergency assistance, 
                                                 
6 See in particular the “EU Programme for Peace & Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and 
the Border Region of Ireland”, which in its latest iteration has been ‘…aimed at reinforcing 





custom and cultural praxis, to military, territorial, political, and status issues across 
transnational networks. It requires the identification and overturning of inequalities and 
discrimination, and political or economic interests cannot trump local legitimacy or social 
norms in situ or at the regional level. It has become so broad, and so much characterised by 
encounters and alterity that often the process is more important than a quick result, and 
different actors change and take over to maintain the process over the longer term, even if an 
agreement appears unlikely. Mediation increasingly spans different temporal and structural 
orders, from the post- colonial, to the liberal peace, and beyond. Thus post-liberal mediation 
involves mediating the tension between different historical epochs, different scales, cultures, 
and identities, different material circumstances, and different forms of legitimate authority. It 
requires a pluriversal outcome and translation (Bhabha 1994; Geertz 1973). It requires a 
progressive engagement with the intensively networked nature of power spanning temporal, 
geographical, institutional, material, and normative dimensions. Post-liberal mediation 
revolves around not local ownership of elite-level agreements, but complex relationalities 




Or An Alternative Version of Stage 3? Neoliberal and Technological Mediation 
 
Mediation after the liberal international era also points in a different direction. A neoliberal 
and technological form endorses the power and exclusion that a genealogical analysis 
uncovers, rather than resists it. Global justice is rebuffed in this guise rather than a focal 
point, displaced by demonstrations of new types of military and technological power by 
states, geopolitical, and non-state actors. As in Syria since 2011, mediation is limited, focused 
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at perhaps even less than a negative peace. It may relate to state elites, capital, and non-state 
actors, as well as be connected to military and technological capacity to dampen conflict, but 
does not aspire to a formal solution in the liberal sense. It does not even aim at a cease-fire 
but instead mediates the continuation of violence in order to avoid further escalation.  It has 
little concern with the plight of populations affected by war or global justice (Lundgren, 
2016). States are under little pressure to adopt liberal values. There are many spaces, such as 
across the Middle East, where intervention means the avoidance of deep structural and 
geopolitical problems in the state or international system, and merely the mitigation (but not 
ending) of violence.  
 This type of mediation operates on the relations between geopolitics, the state, 
technology and capital, and non-state actors- violent and non-violent. It is connected to 
perspectives of resilience and self-helping but remotely governed political subjects, 
envisioned under modern global governance (Chandler 2014: Duffield, 2002). In conflict-
affected situations, rather than international or state forms of physical or diplomatic 
intervention drawing on normative, governmental, or direct power, this would be based on 
‘atmospheric power’ related to a range of technical, informational, social and military, 
capabilities, as well as global capital. It removes its human distant-near components, and does 
not involve any ethical objectives (===). It replaces civil society and rights with resilience 
praxis, and geopolitics with capital and technology (Chandler 2014).  It does not require an 
end to war.  
In this sense mediation would be based on the technological capacity of distant actors 
operating according to their hegemonic values and interests. It is now becoming possible to 
intervene, mediate, conduct peacekeeping and peacebuilding, deliver humanitarian aid, and 
so on from thousands of miles away, with very limited physical presence. This level of 
virtuality does not mediate the interests and ethics of divergent subalterns, or expand their 
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rights. Nor is it supposed to secure their territory. In other words, the underlying logic of this 
type of approach would represent a lubrication of geopolitical and geo-economic priorities, 
with technology being used to block claims for expanded rights or global justice: mediation 




In the cases of Cyprus and the Middle East in the 1970s mediation focussed on power, status 
and territory. In the post-Cold War era intervention began to mediate the sovereign state and 
identity with the liberal peace, as in Bosnia Herzegovina where rights and democracy were 
central to the Dayton Accords. In the case of Northern Ireland, identity, territorial 
sovereignty, and the nature of governance also began to be mediated, leading to more 
complex, post-liberal and pluralist approaches. With the onset of more directly neoliberal 
forms of statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan, territorial sovereignty began to be mediated 
by capital and new technologies of intervention along with revived counter-insurgency 
practices, leading to a reversion to a more securitised form of territorial sovereignty. 
Mediation shifted away from war-endings and state reform as a consequence, and towards the 
maintenance of acceptable and profitable violence to a point where it did not directly threaten 
international order. 
Thus, there appears to be four main stages through which to understand the evolution 
of mediation from a genealogical perspective. They span the narrow diplomatic function of 
mediating between warring parties to maintain the states-system to the broader, discursive 
and critical approach of mediating differences that cause direct or structural forms of violence 
through epistemological coalitions (Hass 1992) emerging in liberal and post-liberal 
approaches, and finally, the mediation of non-state claims, capital, technology and 
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geopolitics. Their underlying rationalities span realism and territoriality, liberalism, rights, 
and global governance, critical theory, post-colonialism and global justice. Mediation, first 
rooted in the states-system, shifted towards euro-centric encounters with others, and then to 
either relationality and global justice or technical fixes under global capital.  
Mediation of the analogue international system and the old international liberal 
architecture has failed systemically, not necessarily in reducing violence but in creating 
sustainable systems: a way forward is not to revert to a system of managed violence, but to 
advance mediation genealogically. This requires the incorporation of local political claims for 
expanded rights in a fluid and digital international framework where legitimate authority is 
made up of shifting networks and relationships, and global justice is the goal. The Oslo 
Accords, the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Annan Plan, and even the Good Friday Accords 
would look quite different as a result and such limitations have been acknowledged at the 
policy level.7 It is not enough to expand the numbers of ‘trained’ mediators across local to 
global, formal to informal scales: there must be a much more critical epistemological framing 
specifically related to questions of justice- temporal, material, and environmental. There is 
evidence in the UN and EU that such rethinking is underway8 about how to mediate conflict 
in a mobile, polycentric and pluriversal, networked and yet power oriented world, in which 
micro-solidarities vie with mainstream state and international architecture, and long term 
sustainability has now become a far more urgent requirement. It raises the question of how to 
address local issues of rights and needs in both historical and global contexts, and how 
densely networked social, state, and international architecture might capture and embed such 
political and ethical values? Almost any individual, located almost anywhere in the world, 
can now quickly find access to the information necessary to determine their relative position 
                                                 
7 See “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, Report of the Secretary-General's 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 2004. 
8 See Confidential Sources, Personal Interviews, UN Peacebuilding Commission, UNDP, and 
DPKO, New York, March 2016. 
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in the world vis-à-vis others: new forms of mediation are thus required to address the more 
sophisticated ethico-political claims that are arising as a consequence. A response to the 
genealogical critiques outlined above would thus connect the practice and theory of 
mediation not to realpolitik, liberal norms, or global capital, but to global justice. 
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